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Japanese Westernization and the American Civil War

Kyle Bridge
University of North Florida

Having already sailed to Japan under US Navy Commodore Matthew Perry
(1794−1858), American author Francis Hall (1822−1902) possessed all the experience
required by the New York Tribune in 1859 for their Japanese correspondent position. Hall
did not take his charge lightly, eventually becoming America’s leading opinion maker on
Japan during the twilight of the Tokugawa period (1600−1868). Hall figured Japan’s
restrictive economics prevented better American relations: “There is no doubt that the
present government is opposed to foreign intercourse, and seeks to obstruct trade [as far
as] the treaty will allow.” 1 Even eruption of the American Civil War did not divert his
focus while stationed in the capital city, Edo. “Mail from the States today,” he wrote in
his diary days before the first engagement at Fort Sumter. “Its secession news exciting
the liveliest interest. Raw silk immediately fell one fourth in price, much to the
astonishment of the Japanese who were unable to understand such a depression.” 2
Apparently Hall and the Japanese prioritized the economy over what foreign relations
existed with the United States.
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As a pragmatic de facto diplomat, Hall encouraged the first Japanese mission to
America in 1860. This first delegation included some prominent figures such as
Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835−1901), an education and publishing magnate, who were
already actively spurring the Westernization of Japan. Another envoy set sail in 1866,
resulting in two fact-finding expeditions neatly bookending the American Civil War
(1861−1865), the most disastrous conflict in US history which saw perhaps 700,000
soldiers and citizens perish in only four years. 3
How did close observation of internal American conflict inform Japanese
perception of Westernization? Did it at all temper men like Fukuzawa’s enthusiasm? Few
records exist even for a conflict so proximal to American exposure, and those that do
indicate little impact. From what has survived the ordeals of time and translation, two
answers could explain the apparent indifference: the delegation desired modernization in
economy and industry with little concern for politics, or that those Japanese pragmatic
enough to abandon traditional customs accepted civil war as a potential outcome. Japan
would experience its own civil war in the late 1860s, so neither of these tentative
responses is mutually exclusive, and some observers like Fukuzawa vindicated both.
Over two centuries of Japanese seclusion policy was ended in 1853 when the US
President Millard Fillmore (1800−1874) dispatched Commodore Perry commanding four
warships to “open up the country” for trade and diplomacy. 4 Japan faced numerous
pressures from within as well: lingering resentment from the great Tempo famine
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(1833−1838), income inequality and samurai impoverishment, and tensions between
regional daimyo and the central Shogunate government, to list a few. By the early 1860s
the Tokugawa Shogunate was thoroughly humiliated and Japanese society ripe for
reform. Within this context the Shogunate encouraged the first embassy in hopes of
salvaging its domestic appeal through modernization and exhibiting itself as a world
power, while the United States hoped to retain commercial amicability and foster this
rising star of the Far East. In fact the US arranged a ship to ferry the embassy; the
Japanese dispatched the warship Karin Matu before the American vessel as a sort of
envoy-preceding envoy. 5
San Francisco was the first stop for the Japanese in America (before this they
docked in Hawaii, then a separate kingdom, to resupply). There they stayed only for a
few days but managed to record their varied first impressions of the city. Their hotel was
so large that a bell summoned service instead of clapping, as was the case back home.
Food was plentiful but greasy and lacking in flavor. Stone or brick buildings lessened
panic from fire. Perhaps most astonishing to one delegate was a local theater in which
women actually performed female roles. 6 Notably absent are discussions of politics,
armaments or substantive diplomacy. In the first leg of the American tour they
emphasized none of these concepts.
Once business (or, more accurately, pleasure) had concluded for the mission in
California, they sailed for Panama and crossed the isthmus by train, from which a boat

Chitoshi Yanaga, "The First Japanese Embassy to the United States," in Pacific Historical Review 9, no.2
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took them to the Washington Naval Yard. Civic receptions greeted them in every city
they entered and the capital was no exception; around 5,000 waited at the harbor and
roughly another 20,000 “insisted on shaking hands with them” as the travelers found their
lodging. 7 Still the expedition leaders declined to investigate American politics, even in
the seat of its government. When taken to a session of Congress, at the height of Southern
discontent, mission officials refrained from asking any questions, explaining “we
considered it as presumptuous to inquire into the state affairs of another nation.” 8 The
only military aspect of their journey was a smelting plant producing weapons at the navy
yard, which actually highlights the paramount purpose of their trip: modernizing industry.
The same official who failed to inquire about congressional politics hoped to examine
records at the patent office, but the constant crowd following the mission deterred him
from doing so. Another field that interested the delegates was currency, specifically
exchange rates. They questioned workers at the Philadelphia National Mint about coin
weight and other factors while watching them melt, weigh, and account for American
money. 9 Obviously, foreign policy was not important to these Japanese on this
expedition.
Ominous signs of the coming Civil War in America were either not sufficient to
disprove that Westernization paid dividends or simply unknown. As details emerged
about the grim conditions gripping the United States, did the Japanese intent on adopting
Western societies question their resolve? Sources available indicate they did not. In his
autobiography Fukuzawa Yukichi mentions the American Civil War only once, referring
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to warships purchased by Japan from military surplus before and during his second trip to
the United States in 1867. 10 In fact by 1875, with the benefit of hindsight, Fukuzawa
reasoned some type of domestic conflict was almost inevitable when new ideas emerge:
“the justification of political authority… these ideas of political legitimation originate, in
the majority of cases, by dint of force of arms.” 11
Whether or not the American Civil War influenced this conclusion, certainly the
turbulent transition from Tokugawa to Meiji did. A movement to restore imperial
authority through the Emperors Kōmei (1831−1867) then Meiji (1852−1912) had
developed in the late Tokugawa period. Harnessing frustration with the establishment,
Kōmei undermined the Shogunate with appeals to anti-Japanese or anti-“barbarian”
sentiment: “the subjugation of the hated foreigner... is the greatest of national tasks facing
us.” 12 Imperial reformers clashed with Tokugawa loyalists in the Boshin War
(1868−1869), ending with restoration of the Emperor Meiji and ascension of a new
nationalist ethos, “rich nation, strong military.” Fukuzawa noted that, when the last
shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837−1914) returned to Edo in defeat, “a dreadful time
was to follow. The entire city seemed to boil and throb with discussion as if the whole
populace had gone mad with suspense… about what the government should do.”
Fukuzawa had his ideas but was “inclined to believe that I was born under a star which
led me away from the political world and kept me apart from all the activities of the
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Restoration.” 13 No matter the cosmic alignment at his birth, Fukuzawa was a
revolutionary in his own way and accepted the conditions needed to bring about societal
change.
Many more reasons than these contributed to the lack of American Civil War
discussion by the Japanese. The language barrier is a likely culprit, stunting conversation
since the first official mission to America, not to mention Americans who might hesitate
to mention or decline to discuss the developing sectional fracture. Most likely, after
observing other Western nations in Europe, the Japanese felt secure enough in the
promise of modernization to ignore the conflict engulfing the United States. In any case
the first diplomatic exchanges between Japan and the world, especially the United States,
were not explicitly political. In the following decade, the “inevitable domestic conflict”
predicted by Fukuzawa did break out, as the Satsuma Rebellion pulled Japan into its own
civil war. Again, the lack of acknowledgement of the American Civil War among
Fukuzawa and his peers was probably an acceptance of Japan's own conceivable
struggles.
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